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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to highlight the structural features that are proving central to
the stability of the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro between the Government of
the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and those features that were detrimental to
its predecessors.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper adopts a legalization framework derived from the model
presented by Abbott et al. The simplicity of Abbott et al.’s theory allows for variation in the agreements’ text to
be easily measured and compared. The inherent advantages of this model offset the difficulties in
characterizing peace agreements under traditional legal methodologies, and reiterate the importance of
legalized agreements in a conflict resolution context.
Findings – This paper finds that a more highly legalized approach to peace-making has resulted in greater
agreement stability in the Philippines. More precise in detail and inclusive in scope, the legal nature of the
2014 Comprehensive Agreement has made it more responsive to the root causes of the conflict, and resilient
to incidents that threatened to derail the peace process.
Practical implications – This case study bears valuable lessons for conflict zones the world over,
particularly the troubled negotiations on Syria, and the crisis in Ukraine. The study: lends tentative support to
Gopalan’s claim that agreements that exemplify hard legalization are much more sustainable in the long run;
stresses the advantages of inclusivity in agreement sustainability and stability; reiterates the importance of
addressing the key issues relevant to the conflict if the process is to be sustainable, and; notes the limitations
of the legalization framework, but presents the Philippine example as a blueprint for addressing various
aspects of the Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts.
Originality/value – This is the first peer-reviewed analysis to explore the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement
as a highly legalized conflict resolution instrument, and an adaptable template for peace agreement
design generally.
Keywords Conflict resolution, International law, Ethnic conflict, Peace-making, Legalization,
Peace research
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
This paper employs a theory of legalization to critically evaluate the protracted peace process
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and Moro insurrectionists in
Mindanao. Underpinning the study is a research question posed by legal and international
relations scholars alike: whether there are certain features that are consistently attributable to
sustainable processes of peace-making (Kittrie, 2003; Morriss, 1996; Fortna, 2003). Though an
ample body of academic work in the field of conflict resolution has examined how belligerents
might achieve victory (Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997, p. 342), how parties may be induced
into negotiation (Walter, 1997), and how certain factors can influence the ultimate success of an
agreement (Gleditsch and Beardsley, 2004; Bekoe, 2003; Stedman et al., 2002; Hartzell, 1999;
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Stedman and Rothchild, 1996), the role that the law can play in sustaining peace processes in the
long term has been largely neglected. This analysis of the process’s most significant agreements
under a legalization framework – derived from the model presented by Abbott et al. (2000) –
highlights the legal features that are proving central to the stability of the 2014 Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and those that were detrimental to its predecessors.
In doing so, it resituates the role of law in sustaining processes of peace.
The 40-year history of the conflict in the Mindanao region of the Philippines is particularly well-
suited for the purposes of this study. First, the Philippine peace process is testament to the claim
that successful features in peace agreements can be borrowed from one process and applied to
another (Bell, 2006, p. 410). The negotiations that culminated with the 2014 CAB were informed
by provisions that had been successfully implemented in various other successful peace
processes. For example, the negotiating parties were influenced by provisions pertaining to
ethnic groups (the peace process between the Acehnese and the Malaysian state in Aceh),
systems of governance (power sharing in Catalonia and Basque country, Spain), and third-party
monitoring (as in South Sudan) (Mastura, 2013). The influence of the South Sudanese process is
now readily observable in the adopted best practices of the International Monitoring Team
operating in the Philippines, which has played a vital role in sustaining the parties’ consensus over
the past year. The Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland has also been acknowledged as a
template for the warring parties’ main grievances (Tisdall, 2013). The CAB provides for the
establishment of an independent commission to advise on policing within the region, similar to
the commission established by Section 9 of the Good Friday Agreement and its Annex on the
Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland. The CAB’s provisions on demobilization also
obligate the parties to put their weapons “beyond use”, a phrase which mirrors the language used
by the parties to the peace process in Northern Ireland. While it would be counterproductive to
condense the unique nature and peculiarities of any given conflict into a single, prototypical
agreement (Omar, 2015), the Philippine experience demonstrates that an examination of
successful agreements can have positive implications for peace processes globally: “Though we
are not ‘copy cats’ of Northern Ireland, no doubt, we can draw concrete lessons from it if we are
looking for a fresh wind blowing our own peace story […]” (Mercado, 2011).
Second, the protracted peace process in Mindanao is ample evidence in itself of Gopalan’s
(2007a) claim that our ignorance in the field of agreement design has seen the repetition of the
same mistakes in successive agreements (pp. 404-405); most notably a failure to address key
issues and consult key actors in the conflict. The sustainability of the peace process has been
repeatedly hampered by “the lack of participation of other stakeholders” (Santos, 2005a, p. 12),
i.e., other Moro ethnic groups, Lumads (the non-Islamized indigenous tribal people of Mindanao),
Christians, and key civil society actors (Paredes, 2015). This omission failed to generate any
enthusiasm among the key stakeholders with regard to the implementation of possible solutions,
and failed to adequately address the interests of these groups (Santos, 2005a, p. 12). Similarly,
the issue of land ownership was repeatedly neglected over 30 years of renewed negotiations,
despite being identified as the most likely source of post-conflict conflict in Mindanao (Oquist,
2002). These major issues have repeatedly proven themselves to be “major gaps” in the GRP-
Moro peace talks, and academics and practitioners alike can learn much from the negotiators’
tendency to avoid these contentious topics. Thus, Mindanao – as was written of Northern Ireland
before it – is an ideal region for a further study of agreement design (Mac Ginty et al., 2007, p. 3).
As a conflict that was waged for 40 years, continuously fuelled by the same radical grievances,
and fought by distinct ethno-religious identities, the Philippine experience of making peace in
Mindanao is similarly suitable for a retrospective analysis of our past triumphs and failures alike
(Morriss, 1996, p. 831).
2. Legalization theory
Legalization is a particularly appropriate lens under which the legal characteristics of peace
agreements can be examined. Rather than viewing agreements as the product of either hard law
or pure politics, Abbott et al.’s concept of legalization envisions a much broader spectrum of
definition for legalized instruments that cannot be accurately categorized under traditional legal
methodologies. Abbott et al. argue that a statute can attain legal status, or compensate for
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ambiguous legal form, by undergoing a distinct process of institutionalization, or legalization.
A legalized statute, they argue, is comprised of three characteristics: obligation, precision
and delegation.
Obligation refers to the extent to which an agreement’s text establishes a normatively compelling
and legally binding obligation on the parties. More specifically, obligation measures the degree to
which the signatories’ behaviour “is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, and
discourse” of domestic and international law (Abbott et al., 2000, p. 401).
Precision entails the degree to which the provisions of the statute unambiguously prescribe the
actions required, authorized or prohibited by the statute. Rules that are high on precision are
usually “highly elaborated or dense, detailing conditions of application, spelling out required or
proscribed behaviour in numerous situations” (Abbott et al., 2000, p. 413). Precision narrows the
scope for self-serving interpretation by the contracting parties and limits the space for deviation
from projected behaviour, characteristics that are of particular importance in a conflict resolution
context. As Bell notes, “the language of peace agreements bears this out: they are written
through with agreed numbers of armed forces, specification of weaponry, timetables, and even
maps” (Bell, 2006, p. 396).
Finally, delegation refers to the third-party actors or institutions to which the authority to
implement, interpret and enforce the rules of the agreement has been delegated. Highly
delegated provisions ideally provide for interpretative authority to be vested in courts, arbitrators
and mediatory or ad hoc tribunals, all of which may serve as dispute resolution mechanisms. Just
as high levels of obligation and precision result in “the minimization of wiggle room to make
excuses”, so too do effective grants of delegation increase “the incentives for cooperation and the
costs of opportunism” (Gopalan, 2007b, pp. 693-711).
In defining the complex process of legalization along three dimensions, Abbott et al.’s theory
allows us to gauge the impact of highly obligatory, precise and delegative provisions within an
agreement’s text on the resulting peace process. The simplicity of this framework allows for
comparative data to be drawn from the various agreements examined (Raustiala, 2005, p. 583).
These inherent advantages offset the difficulties in characterizing agreements between state and
non-state actors – such as those in the Philippines – under traditional concepts of law (Kahler
2000, p. 661), and “point to the importance of legalized models as an alternative to formal legal
status” in a conflict resolution context (Bell, 2006, p. 375).
Agreements that rank high on all three dimensions are said to exemplify “hard legalization”, i.e.,
those agreements that bear the character of hard law. Agreements that exhibit “soft legalization”
are more akin to soft law, or “purely political” instruments. In their example, Abbott et al. point cite
domestic legal systems “as prototypical of hard legalization” (Abbott et al., 2000, p. 402). They
refer to a statute ratified by a legislative process which is legally binding on all of the nation’s
citizens (obligation), is clear and unambiguous in the behaviour that it requires or proscribes
(precision) and is subject to judicial interpretation by the judiciary and enforcement by the organs
of the police force (delegation). This study adopts their example as the standard for a highly
legalized agreement. Conversely, an agreement that is largely rhetorical, lacking in substantive
legal effect, and ambiguous with regard to its enforcement and interpretation is considered to be
an example of soft legalization. Variation among agreements is not considered a binary choice
between hard and soft legalization, but may depend on the extent to which the institutions
established under the agreement are comprised, mandated and established, or the degree to
which the implementation of the agreement is precisely laid out. Such variation is readily
observable in the principle outputs of the Philippine peace process analysed herein.
It is thus unsurprising that both Bell and Gopalan have identified a positive correlation between
hard legalization and sustainable processes of peace. Gopalan (2007a, b) for one, has repeatedly
pointed to the link between hard legalization and the sustainability of agreements between ethnic-
dyads that are prone to conflict (p. 45; p. 726). However, highly legalized instruments can
often be “a double-edged sword” (von Stein, 2008, p. 248). Explicitly defined agreements often
require a sophisticated domestic institutional infrastructure (Kucik and Reinhardt, 2008, p. 501);
they can prove inflexible in fluid situations (Koremenos et al., 2001, p. 793), and they often
increase concerns about the parties’ ability to comply when these adverse shocks occur
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(von Stein, 2008, p. 248). This concerns are particularly heightened in peacebuilding scenarios,
where agreements must be able to address both short-term and long-term peace process goals
(Bell, 2006, p. 393; von Stein, 2008, p. 248). This analysis of the conflict in Mindanao reaffirms
Gopalan’s study, however, and serves as a sterling example of a vicious conflict peacefully
resolved, at a time when conflicts the world over are proving particularly resistant to negotiated
settlement. It is to that example that we now turn.
3. Conflict in Mindanao
The root causes of the Mindanao conflict pertain to successive administrative policies of ethnic
minoritization and systematic marginalization of the predominantly Muslim Moro people of the
southernmost Philippines from the Christian-Filipino mainstream of Philippine society (Buendia
2005, p. 145). Christians, as 90 per cent of the population of the Philippines, have traditionally
been advantaged by government policy, usually to the detriment of their Moro neighbours.
Indeed, over the last 50 years, the predominantly Muslim region of Mindanao has lagged behind
other urban centres in the Philippines in terms of socio-economic development (Quimpo 2001,
p. 275). Today, provinces with a Muslim majority continue to rank among “the poorest, least
educated, and most dangerous places in the Philippines” (Tuminez, 2008, pp. 122-3), with the
little infrastructural and educational opportunities that these provinces receive “disproportionately
going to serve Christian areas” (Ahmad, 2000, p. 13). Were it not for this uneven distribution of
resources within majority-Muslim areas, “Mindanao provinces would not fare so poorly in terms of
overall human development and one of the factors fuelling the conflict would be mitigated”
(Cagoco-Guiam, 2003, p. 11).
In the late 1960s, the Moro began to chafe under “the perennial discrimination against [them] in
many levels of the national life” (Majul, 1985, p. 31). In 1972, the Moro secessionist sentiment
exploded into armed conflict when President Ferdinand Marcos imposedmartial law to quell what
he perceived as one of the biggest threats to national security, second only to the armed
communist insurrection that was emerging at the same time (Quimpo, 2001, p. 275). Thus began
a conflict that has persisted into the twenty-first century and outlived numerous peace accords in
the process.
Though the Moro cause has been significantly advanced over the course of the decades-long
conflict – initially under Nur Misuari”s Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and later, under the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group of the original MNLF – the entrenched
social, cultural, and religious cleavages that separate those of the Filipino nation and those of the
Moro nation, or “Bangsamoro”, ultimately caused “the extreme protraction of the peace process”
(Santos, 2005a, p. 18). Negotiations have come to mirror “the complexity of the Philippines’
physical geography – an archipelago with differing concentrations of conflict and social
organization, where even the history of negotiations is disjointed and diverse” (Stankovitch and
Carl, 1999, p. 5). This paper examines the most significant outputs of the peace process: the
1976 Tripoli Agreement, its successor, the 1996 Final Agreement, and the most recent CAB,
signed in March 2014. As products of a formalized legal process that officially ended the conflict,
these agreements satisfy the definition of peace agreements as accepted in the literature
(Vinjamuri and Boesenecker, 2007, p. 6). It is to those agreements that we now turn.
4. The Agreements
4.1 The Tripoli Agreement (1976)
The Moro question was initially addressed by the Tripoli Agreement of 1976. The Agreement
sought to establish Moro autonomy in the Southern Philippines, but the GRP would only accept a
political solution that maintained the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic.
Facing mounting diplomatic pressure to accept some sort of compromise on the issue, the MNLF
abandoned their strategic goal of secession and settled instead for autonomy within the Philippine
Republic. In accepting these conditions, the MNLF was attempting to affect change through
the same institutions that it had perceived as failing its constituency in the past, inadvertently paving
the way for the GRP’s unilateral implementation of the agreement on its own terms later.
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The Tripoli Agreement did appear to promise genuine autonomy for the Moros on paper, setting
out executive and legislative organs, and judicial courts with the authority to enforce Shari’ah law.
However, the Agreement postponed settlement on several issues to a later date, rendering
implementation a difficulty from the outset. For example, the area of autonomy was to be
empowered with its own administrative system and its own economic and financial system. In
both instances, the relationship between these systems and the central government in
Manila was to be discussed later, but without clarification on this issue, it was impossible for these
institutions to function on the basis of the Tripoli Agreement alone. Such postponements
rendered the Tripoli Agreement a process document at best, not a final and comprehensive
peace agreement. In the absence of precise terms, the parties to the agreement could not
meaningfully commit to anything of substantive legal effect; they were merely declaring
mutually shared principles, ambitions and vagaries. The short-term gains of this tactic come at
the cost of long-term peacebuilding, paving the way for claims of broken promises, and
grounds for misunderstanding that could have been avoided altogether had the text been
more highly legalized in accordance with Abbott et al.’s model. Instead, the imprecision that
plagued the Tripoli Accord caused it to become “bogged down” in implementation, and
eventually, it came apart.
Ironically, the provisions that were the most purposive and definite in tone were perhaps the most
forcefully dismissive of conciliation between the parties. The limitations imposed by upholding the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine state denied the Moro people a role in the
peace process. The Agreement had failed to empower the Moros with any form of political
autonomy – particularly, the capacity to implement their side of the agreement. Instead, the Tripoli
Agreement actually became a legitimate basis for GRP unilateralism with regard to the Moro
conflict (Santos, 2005b, pp. 9-10).
4.1.1 Result. On the whole, the Tripoli Agreement was low on precision, obligation and
delegation, and is an example of soft legalization. The agreement left too many details to be
clarified at a later date for it to be considered a legalized basis for lasting peace. This omission
merely postponed the inevitable disagreement between the parties and presented a quasi-
agreement in its stead. By paving the way for GRP unilateralism and failing to delegate any power
away from state sovereignty, the agreement was open to subjective interpretation and could
therefore be fit to any purpose that the GRP wished. Without any effective role in its
implementation, the MNLF saw secession as the only viable alternative, and fighting broke out
once more in 1977.
Despite failing to achieve lasting peace, the Tripoli Accord remains “the most significant juncture”
in the GRP-MNLF negotiations (Santos, 2005a, p. 3). The agreement effectively changed the
Moro problem from a question of independence to one of autonomy. From 1976 onward, all
negotiations between the GRP and the alternating Moro groups took place within a unitary state
model that preserved the sovereignty and territorial unity of the Philippine state. Accordingly,
the Tripoli Agreement became the “main term of reference” between the GRP and the MNLF for
the next 20 years (Santos, 2005a, p. 3).
4.2 The Final Agreement (1996)
It was not until 1996 that the GRP and MNLF appeared to turn a corner in their search for an end
to the conflict. Following preliminary meetings in Libya in 1992, and West Java in 1993, the GRP
and the MNLF agreed to hold formal peace talks to discuss the full implementation of the 1976
Tripoli Agreement, including “those portions of the Agreement left for further discussion […]”.
The peace talks thus inherited the limitations imposed by the Tripoli Agreement, and reaffirmed
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and Constitution of the Philippine state.
The Final Agreement was a much more precise document than its predecessor, providing for a
Moro executive and legislature, and autonomous organs in educational and economic matters.
However, the correlation between these institutions and the causes of the conflict was so weak
that they did little to quell discontent in Mindanao. Autonomy was once more pushed to the
forefront of the peace process, and its perception as a cure-all formula for the conflict in
Mindanao proved much to the detriment of the other factors that had fuelled the conflict up unto
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that point: systematic policies of discrimination that were tied to issues of land ownership.
For example, the Final Agreement vowed to make the new autonomous region the focus of
intensive peace and development efforts. Public and private investments would be channelled into
the region to spur economic activity, and a public body was tasked with attracting foreign
investment into the Southern Philippines. Yet despite an enthusiastic response from the
international community (Gutierrez, 1999, p. 66), these efforts failed to achieve the result that the
agreement anticipated.Without confronting the systematic structures of inequality that underpinned
Mindanao’s chronic underdevelopment, economic investment could only do so much.
Despite the commitment that the MNLF displayed to peacemaking, problems with
implementation proved, once more, “that there was nothing “final” in the Final Peace
Agreement: it was just a prelude to more detours on the rocky road ahead” (Cagoco-Guiam,
2003, p. 4). Indeed, less than a month after its signature, the compromise enshrined in the Final
Agreement was proving too good to be true. The presidential decree initiating the Agreement
(Executive Order 371) was guilty of notable omissions and imprecisions, failing to specifically
allocate funds for the transitional organs and displaying a lesser degree of precision than the
peace agreement itself (Gutierrez, 1999, pp. 66-8). As a result, the key institutions of the
autonomous region were created in an environment that restricted their overall impact and made
them powerless: “[t]hey had very limited funding, no police powers, no control over national
projects and programmes that were supposed to be within their remit […]” (Gutierrez, 1999,
pp. 66-7), and no function other than to make recommendations to the Office of the President.
4.2.1 Result. The Final Agreement is high on precision and medium-high on obligation, and is an
example of hard legalization. Though the agreement’s achievements were unprecedented at the
time, and paved the way for a more comprehensive peace in the decades to come, they fell short
of ensuring a permanent peace, however (Bertrand, 2000, p. 54). The Executive Order charged
with implementing the initial phases of the agreement did not adopt as high a degree of
legalization as the agreement itself did. A lesser degree of precision saw the omission of some
notable details, including provision for the independent funding of the autonomous institutions.
These omissions can be directly linked to the failures of the autonomous government to provide
for its citizens.
These mistakes could have been avoided had the implementation of the Final Agreement not
been so dependent on GRP legislation. As the process progressed, dissatisfaction grew within
the MNLF over its perceived marginalization from the implementation of the agreement.
It accused the GRP of implementing the agreement “unilaterally without completely and satisfac-
torily implementing the important socio-economic development requirements of the process”
(Santos, 2005a, p. 16). As a result, “autonomy” became something of an unpleasant word in
Muslim Mindanao: an empty political formula that had “failed to deliver genuine political power,
representation, or economic development” (Tuminez, 2008, p. 124). Instead, the failings of the Final
Agreement highlighted the need to focus attention on the root causes of the Mindanao conflict: the
relationship between Christians, Muslims and other minority peoples, and land ownership.
4.3 The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2014)
In an environment where the MNLF and the implementation of the Final Agreement were
beginning to unravel, the MILF emerged as the new standard bearer of Moro aspirations. By
virtue of a stop-start process of peace-making, and a proliferation of ceasefire agreements
between the GRP and the MILF, the MILF and the Moro people became hopeful that “a better,
and more effective agreement” than the 1996 settlement could be achieved (Bertrand, 2000,
p. 50). These expectations effectively drained away the little support the MNLF had for the Final
Agreement with the GRP, and ruled out the 1996 agreement as a comprehensive solution for the
Moro people (Bertrand, 2000, p. 50).
GRP-MILF negotiations began to take shape immediately after the GRP had secured the 1996
peace with the MNLF. The MILF rejected the Final Agreement, rejecting autonomy as a cure-all for
the Moro problem, and perceiving the agreement as a deviation from the original terms of the
Tripoli accord (Santos, 2005a, p. 3). Negotiations were “glacial but steady” (ICG, 2008, p. 2),
gradually moving forward on a step-by-step basis, with various ceasefire agreements becoming
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a precedent for further progress. Indeed, underpinning the MILF negotiating strategy was the
belief “that each agreement represents a small and cumulative step forward” (ICG, 2004, p. 6).
This belief aptly reflected the progress of the wider Philippine peace process: every agreement
between the Moro revolutionary groups and the GRP – despite their many flaws discussed
herein – marked another step towards a more comprehensive and final peace.
That comprehensive peace took shape in March 2014, when the GRP and MILF peace panels
signed the CAB. The CAB is the most expansive and inclusive of all the agreements that have
documented the Moro conflict, and is rightly deserving of its title as a comprehensive settlement.
The agreement is evidence of the knowledge both parties have gleaned from over 40 years of
dearly bought lessons. The extensive consultation with Christian and Lumad communities
undertaken by the GRP and MILF peace panels prior to the 2014 agreement is an implicit
acknowledgement of how previously isolating these groups from the peace process had been a
critical flaw. Indeed, inclusivity underpins the Moro homeland – or Bangsamoro – envisioned
under the CAB. The agreement’s Annex on Power Sharing provides that representation in the
autonomous region’s assembly shall reflect the diversity of the Bangsamoro, thereby taking
non-Moro communities, women and settler communities into account.
The lessons learned from over 40 years of diplomatic engagement can also be seen in the CAB’s
recognition of the land issue. The agreement – unlike any of its predecessors – acknowledges the
“unjust dispossession” of the Bangsamoro of their territorial and proprietary rights as a central
issue underpinning the conflict. Not only does this provision officially address the contentious
issue of land, it also provides a legal basis for the Moro people to seek reparation and further their
own development where restoration of tenure is no longer possible. The reported systematic
minoritization of Muslim land ownership over the course of the twentieth century had rendered the
Moro homeland grossly underdeveloped; but this provision may yet serve as a basis for reversing
that trend. In the absence of more precise provisions, this remains to be seen in practice, however.
There is also evidence to suggest that both parties have learned from the successes of
agreements that have resolved conflict in other parts of the world, and have applied these
lessons in turn to the Philippine experience. For example, the CAB’s provisions on policing in
the Bangsamoro, bear a striking resemblance to the provisions on policing and justice in the
Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland. The CAB establishes an Independent
Decommissioning Body – as in Northern Ireland – tasked with amassing the MILF’s small
arms and putting them “beyond use”, a phrase that echoes the commitments of the parties to the
peace process in Northern Ireland. The successful adaptation of these provisions in the Philippine
context is just a glimpse of the potential knowledge we can garner from a broader analysis of
peace processes worldwide.
The CAB concludes with a vow that this agreement will not be implemented unilaterally. This
provision is not merely a political expression of good will – the body of text and annexes that
comprise the CAB espouse the value of partnership between the GRP and the MILF and give
effect to a range of political mechanisms that necessitate their cooperation. This move away from
unilateral implementation is indicative of an overarching shift in the way the conflict in Mindanao
has come to be perceived. Autonomy is no longer seen as the sole solution to the conflict, but it is
an effective means for the Bangsamoro to address the issues that fuelled it for 40 years. The most
sustainable solution lies in addressing those issues – land ownership, wealth sharing, the rights of
indigenous and minority peoples and their relationship with the Moro people – and the CAB is an
unprecedented accomplishment in that regard.
4.3.1 Result. Ultimately, the CAB is high on precision and high on obligation when compared to
its predecessors, and is an example of hard legalization. Granted, many of the institutions
envisioned by the CAB are not entirely novel or creative departures from those that came before;
autonomous executive, legislative and judicial organs had been included in the earlier Final
Agreement, but did not result a final peace. This suggests that the shift towards legalizing the
CAB has had a significant impact on sustaining the relevant parties’ consensus, thereby
encouraging expectations that this agreement may finally bring about peace in Mindanao. Not
only have the omissions and failings of previous agreements been addressed in the CAB – an
inclusion that is significant in and of itself – but moreover, they have been considered in detail.
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It would be unwise to conclude on the ultimate success of the CAB before seeing how these
details play out in practice – the Final Agreement teaches us a valuable lesson in that regard.
Moreover, as Quilala (2015) predicted (p. 104), the Aquino administration’s failure to ratify the
CAB before the Philippine Congress in February 2016 continues to cast a long shadow over
the peace process. Nevertheless, there is room for cautious optimism that the level of precision
evident in the CAB may yet sustain some of the same provisions that bore huge potential for
peace in the past.
5. Conclusions
An analysis of the GRP-Moro peace process thus reaffirms Gopalan’s claim: agreements that
exemplify hard legalization and espouse legal certainty are much more sustainable in the long run.
Agreements that are high on precision, in particular, encourage more stable and durable
settlements that legally bind the parties to a greater extent than their imprecise counterparts.
For example, the low-precision evident in the Tripoli Agreement rendered it an uncertain roadmap
to peace at best. Its ambiguity with regard to the key issues caused the consensus between the
MNLF and the GRP to become unstable when these issues had to be discussed in more detail.
Similarly, the Final Agreement, though wholly more precise than its predecessor, came apart due
to a lack of precision in the Executive Order charged with implementing the agreement.
Though the CAB was also guilty of postponing its finer details to an uncertain date in the future,
imprecision was mitigated by the precision evident throughout the rest of the CAB. Unlike its
predecessors, the CAB avoids unilateral means of implementation and precisely provides for
structures of cooperation. This allows both parties to settle their disputes within the legal limits of
the peace process as partners in peace-making. It is submitted that these precisely worded
provisions alleviated the worries of the MILF, who were able to anticipate with certainty what they
would get out of the agreement and change their behaviour accordingly. This highlights the
impact of legal language on the behaviour of former belligerents, and reiterates the importance of
legalized instruments as means to resolve conflict.
The stop-start processes in Syria and Ukraine could learn much from this legalized approach to
peace-making. Both conflicts have been subject to conflict resolution instruments that have been
legally binding in the abstract, but dead letter in practice (Pauwelyn and Andonova, 2015), In
Ukraine, for example, the Minsk II Protocol failed to specify exactly where the “truce line”
separating the belligerent parties lay, an omission that paved the way for the skirmishes that soon
followed after the conclusion of the agreement (Kinstler, 2015). Similarly, UN Security Resolutions
2254 and 2165 on Syria stressed the need for monitoring mechanisms with regard to a cessation
of hostilities and the delivery of humanitarian aid, respectively, but failed to specify exactly how
these bodies might function in practice. This emphasis on being legally binding in form but not in
substantive content has done nothing to move these conflicts towards a satisfactory outcome,
and suggests that both conflicts could benefit from a highly legalized process setting out
precise and practical follow-up procedures, including periodic reviews and the imposition of
sanctions and exacting deadlines (Pauwelyn and Andonova, 2015; Shabaneh, 2013).
The conclusion of the CAB also stresses the importance “of open, structured and inclusive
negotiations to end conflict” (Vatikiotis, 2014). The GRP-Moro peace process has charted a
broad spectrum of inclusivity, and the stability of its most significant outputs can also be charted
on this same spectrum, with exclusive and divisive negotiations often producing a haphazard
peace. In the case of Tripoli, the exclusive negotiations between Misuari’s MNLF and the GRP
provided little room for dissenting voices in the MNLF to have their say on Moro aspirations, and
engendered a split in the MNLF ranks. The Final Agreement also came under fire for its “much
vaunted ‘consensus and consultations”’, which “were largely limited to the negotiating parties,
except for a few token efforts to communicate with civil society organisations” (Stankovitch and
Carl, 1999, p. 8). The CAB, in contrast, was informed by a consultative process that engaged the
stakeholders who would be affected by the creation of the Bangsamoro, and this is evident in
the resulting text. The CAB explicitly recognizes the rights and traditions of indigenous peoples,
and provides for their representation in the Bangsamoro assembly. As a result of the
CAB’s inclusivity, the agreement takes a comprehensive account of the broader social problems
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that have beset Mindanao: chronic underdevelopment, the distribution of wealth and resources;
and not just the ethno-nationalistic cause of the Moro people which had dominated the focus
of previous agreements.
The need for open and inclusive negotiations has not been lost on peacemakers in Ukraine and
Syria, where regional and international stakeholders have been recognized as central to the
success of any long-term solution. However, negotiations remain beset by differences at the
most radical level. In the aftermath of the Minsk II Protocol, officials in Kiev declined to meet
face-to-face with pro-Russian elements, labelling them as “terrorists” (Bovt, 2015). Despite an
unprecedented effort to include and unite, proximity talks on Syria in early 2016 have also been
marred by the omission of Kurdish forces, key militant opposition groups and women. Both of
these conflicts could benefit from the inclusive example set by the CAB, which has empowered
the MILF as a bulwark against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in the Southern Philippines,
and has provided a vital role for women and minority peoples in sustaining the peace process.
The importance of precision and inclusion came together to great effect in the form of the CAB,
and thereby revealed another key lesson in peace-making – that sustainable processes of peace
must address all the key issues relevant to the conflict. While this may seem obvious, the desire to
postpone or evade difficult and contentious issues has been a glaring omission from over
40 years of peace-making in the Philippines, and is a marked feature of conflicts the world over.
The CAB, however, explicitly addresses the issues that originally ignited the conflict in Mindanao
and repeatedly fuelled it, despite several negotiated agreements: land ownership, religion, and
the relationship between Moros, Christians and Lumads who comprise Filipino society. The CAB
directly addresses these key issues and brings the relevant stakeholders that have created such
violent conflict together, in a bid to pacify these volatile components.
A comprehensive account of the key issues underpinning the conflict in Syria appears to be a
distant prospect at this moment, but peace-making efforts in Ukraine could be revitalized by
recourse to the Philippine example. To date, the Minsk Protocols have failed to address the key
issue of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the political process envisioned under
Minsk II has repeatedly stalled because the text did not set out the institutions necessary to sustain
it. The Ukrainian crisis is thus particularly analogous to the Philippine example, which posed similar
questions about territorial integrity, regional autonomy and ethnic differences. As a highly legalized
and precise document that stands in stark contrast to the Minsk Protocols, the CAB could serve as
a template to this seemingly intractable conflict that runs the risk of enduring permanently.
The Ukrainian and Syrian examples also highlight the limitations of this study and the limited utility
of highly legalized agreements in a conflict resolution context, however. It is broadly recognized
that a successful peace agreement usually reflects the unique peculiarities of the conflict it aims to
resolve, and in that regard, “no one pattern suits all” (Hottinger, 2006, p. 49). The conflicts in both
Ukraine and Syria possess distinct characteristics that make them ill-suited to a settlement in the
vein of the CAB. Given their strategic geopolitical location, both countries have presented
themselves as landscapes for competing international interests to act upon, and for proxy forces
to operate in. This has complicated the formulation of a coordinated international and inclusive
national approach to resolving the conflicts in a manner that the Mindanao conflict did not.
Furthermore, the rigid limitations often imposed by hard law could potentially frustrate the
operation of highly legalized agreements in both Syria and Ukraine. Kucik and Reinhardt observe
that highly legalized systems require highly sophisticated domestic legal and political institutions,
significant resources and the administrative expertise to make them work (2008:501). Unlike the
Philippine state, Ukraine and Syria are experiencing periods of violent political upheaval, and
arguably in the latter case, collapse. As such, it is questionable whether either possess the
institutional capacity to implement a rigidly defined comprehensive settlement. The Philippine
experience does, however, offer some general direction on how to go about realizing that
settlement, and amassing the relevant stakeholders necessary to make it work.
It remains to be seen whether the CAB’s text, which bears so much promise, can stand the test
of time. The agreement was recently celebrated upon the second anniversary of its conclusion,
and in those two years, it has weathered the political fallout of a deadly “mis-encounter” between
Philippine military and MILF forces in Mamasapano. But this analysis, like many others, must
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concede than an examination of any peace process ‘is bound to be a snapshot of “a work in
progress”’ (Simmons and Dixon, 2006, p. 6). Concerns remain about how the politics of inclusion
espoused by the CAB will play out in practice (Paredes, 2015, p. 175), and the causal roots of
violence may yet persist in Mindanao even if the agreement is successfully implemented (Layador,
2015, pp. 87-8). However, the CAB’s outright rejection of unilateralism and its broadly inclusive
process of peace-making has sustained the parties’ commitment to a peaceful solution to date
despite these challenges, and evidences how the stakeholders have learned from previous
shortcomings. Should the CAB endure, it will continue to offer hope to the Moro and Filipino
peoples trying to escape decades of conflict, and may serve as inspiration to those trying to
escape a similar plight in Ukraine and Syria.
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